Harry G. Heathman v. Sumner J. Hatch : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1962
Harry G. Heathman v. Sumner J. Hatch : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Respondent;
Harry G. Heathman; Pro Se;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Heathman v. Hatch, No. 9593 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3974
IN THE SUP.REME COURT 
of the . ~ D 
STATE OF UTAH~ ":._ :. 
HARRY G. HEATHl\IAN, 
Plaintiff and Appella;nt, 
Case No. 
-vs.- 9593 
SUMNER J. HATCH, 1JM!'lC~RSITY UT /A 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Final Order of the 
Third District ·Court for Salt Lake County 
Hon. ~faurice Harding, Judge, pro tern 
HARRY G. HEATHMAN 
P. 0. Box 15285 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney, per se for Appellant 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
NATURE OF CA·SE ·····················-···········---·-····-···-························· 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT............................................ 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL................................................ 3 
STATEMENT OF F A'CTS............................................................ 3 
ARGUMENTS ................... __ ......................... -------------··· ... _____ ... .. . ...... 11 
POINT I 
THE APPELLATE COURT MUST VIEW THE REC-
ORD IN A MANNER MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAIN-
TIFF. ........................................................................................ 11 
POINT II 
THE APPELLATE COURT MUST CONSIDER ALL 
OF PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED 
, . COMPLAINT TRUE AS T'O BOT'H FIRST AND SE·C-
OND CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................... 15 
POINT III 
THAT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH-
OUT ALLOWING SAME TO BE AMENDED IF IT IS 
INSUFFICIENT, AND ERRED IN NOT FULLY CO·N-
SIDERING PLAINTIFF COULD NOT OBTAIN AN 
ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HIM AND THAT 
COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION 
IN BEHALF OF LAYMAN . ................................................ 16 
POINT IV 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENT'ERING 
ORDER OF THE COURT MAY 25, 1961, IN THIS 
CAUSE, CASE NO. 129540 DISMISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT IN DISTRI,CT COURT CASE 
NO. 128599. ··········································-·············-------·-······--··-·· 17 
POINT V 
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ABSENCE OF STAT'E 
BAR ASSOCIATION ACTING OR P'ERFORMING ITS 
DUTY SHOULD DISCIPLINE ATTORNEYS HATCH 
AND JONES AND PROTECT THIS PLAINTIFF 
FROM THEIR FURTHER MISCONDUCT UPON THE 
FOLLOWING TWO THEORIES: -----------·····---------------------- 18 
A. APPELLATE COURT HAS THE ABSOLUTE 
AND FINAL JURISDICTION OF DISCIPLINING 
ATTORNEYS. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1~\"l):t~X-( Continu~_~d) 
Page 
B. APPELLANT HAS RIGHT TO PROTE·CTION 
FROM ATiTORNEYS IN THEIR WILLFUL VIO-
LATION OF STATUTES AND CANNON OF 
RULES OF ET'HICS ON ATTORNEY'S CON-
DUCT. 
POINT VI 
THAT COURT ERRED IN ITS DET'ERMINATION 
BY ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1961, DISMISS-
ING PLAIN'TIFF'S SECOND AMENDED GOM-
PLAIN·T' "F·OR F AlLURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO 
COMPLY WITH ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIR-
ING PLAINTIFF T'O STATE THE FACTS OF HIS 
ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION IN PLAIN AND 
CONICISE T'ERMS." NO SUCH ORDER OR ENTRY 
MADE IN THIS GAUSE. ··········--·----------------------------------------- 19 
POINT VII 
THE APPELLANT'S FIRST CAUSE IN TORT 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ADEQUATELY 
STATES A PRIMA FACIE CAUSE AND CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF ON THE FO·LLOWING THEO·RIES: 
A. AN ATTORNEY IS LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR 
NEGLIGENCE, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESEN-
TATION, MISCONDUCT, AND BREACH OF 
PROFESSIONAL DUTY Il\fPOS'ED BY LAW.-------- 20 
B. THXT DEFENDANT LAWYER VIOLATED THE 
CONSTITU·TION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE CONSTfTUTION OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AND 'THE STATUTES OF THiE STATE 
OF UTA.H DESIGNED T·O PROTECT THE LIB-
ERTY AND PROPERTY OF PLAINTIFF, THE 
EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
INTENDED TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF. ---------------- 24 
B(1) 'THAT TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL VIOLAT-
ED PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
FOR ABOVE REASONS. -···---------------------------------------- 26 
P·OINT VIII 
THAT PLAIN'TIFF, A LAYMAN NOT SKILLED AND 
NOT LEARNED IN THE LAW PREVAILED IN ALL 
' MATTERS OF HIS DEFEN·SE WHERE DEFEND-
ANT FAILED. ·········------------------------------·····-·······-------------------- 29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




THAT DEFENDANT PREPARED A VOID NOTICE 
OF SALE IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF. --------··········------ 29 
POINT X 
THAT DEFENDANT FAILED AND REFUSED TO 
FOLLOW PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE INSTRUC-
T! ON S. . ..................... ----········· ---·-··-········································-·· 29 
POINT XI 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY STATES A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR SPECIAL 
DAMAGES BASED UPON NEGLIGEN·CE AND NEG-
LIGENT MISREPRES1ENTATION -·-------------·········-··········· 30 
POINT XII 
MISJOINDER OF ISSUES AND DAMAGE IS NOT A 
VALID GROUNDS T'O DISMISS A COMPLAINT ......... 30 
POINT XIII 
THAT THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN SIGNING 
AND FILING "FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW NUNC PRO TUNC" IN THIS GAUSE, 
JANUARY 23, 1962 ............................................................... 31 
POINT XIV 
THE APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE ADEQUATE-
LY STATES A PRIMA FACIE CAUSE AND ·CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF BASED UPON FRAUD, DECEIT, CON-
SPIRACY, AND WILLFUL FRAUDULENT MISREP-
RESENTATION AS FOLLOWS: 
A. AN ATTORNEY IS LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR 
WILLFUL KNOWING, FRAUDULENT MISREP-
RESENTATION AND MISCONDUCT, WILLFUL 
KNOWING BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL DUTY 
IMPOSED BY LAW, BY WILLFUL KNO·WING 
FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE 'CARE, ORDIN-
ARY PRUDENCE AND SKILL IN CLIENT'S 
BE HALF. . .... -------- ................................................. ------------ 32 
B. THAT DEFENDANT FRAUDULENTLY, WILL-
FULLY AND KNOWINGLY VIOLATED THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND OF THE STATE OF UT.AH AND THE 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH DESIGNED 
TO PROTECT THE LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I~\l)EX-( Continued) 
Page 
OF PLAINTIFF; THAT DE'FENDANT FRAUD-
ULENTLY, WILLFULLY, AND KNOWINGLY 
VIOLATED THE EQUAL RIGHT'S AND DUE 
PRO·CESS OF LAW INTENDED FOR PLAIN-
TIFF'S PROTEICTI·ON. ---------------------------------···------------ 32 
B(1) THAT TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL VIOLAT-
ED PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
FOR ABO·VE REASONS. 
POINT XV 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY STATES A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF. AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR SPECIAL 
DAMAGES BASED UPON FRAUD, DECEIT, AND 
CONSPIRACY. ---·------ -------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
POINT XVI 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY STATES A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR TREBLE 
DAMAGES BASED UPON TITLE 78-51-31, U.C.A. 1953 35 
CON CLU SI 0 N ------------ --------------------------------------------------------·--·--· ----· 35 
CASES CITED 
Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P2d 1277 (1937) .. 20 
Butting Tractor v. Ford, 2 U2d 275 272 P.2d 191 (1954) ________ 20 
Cornell v. Edien, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P. 602 ( 1914) ····-----·····----22-24 
Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 U.2d 20, 268 P.2d 988 (1954) ____________ 32 
Hackford v. Industrial Comm., 364 P.2d 1091 (1961) ................ 18 
Hager v. Reclamation District Supra, 111 U.S. 708 (1883) .... 26 
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517 (1954) 80 S.E. 2d 144-6 ........ 23 
Kimika Torna, administrix v. Utah Power & Light Co., 365 
P.2d 788, Utah Supreme Court No. 9402 (1961) ________________ 21 
Lally v. Kuster, 177 Ca'l. 783, 171 P. 961 ( 1918) ····---········-----···· 30 
Langlois v. Ries, 10 U.2d 272-5, 351P.2d 638 (1960) ................ 27 
Liquor Control Comm. v. Athas, 121 U. 453, 243 P.2d 441 
( 1952) ·-----···················-··-----------------···················--··--········----·-···· 13 
Re MacFarlane 10 U.2d 217, 35'0 P.2d 631 (1960) .................... 19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX-(Con tin ned) 
Page 
McGavin v. Preferred Ins. Exch. 7 U.2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 
( 1958) ························································································ 14 
Modica v. Crist, 102 Cal. 2d 144-6, 276 P.2d 614 (1954) ........ 22 
Pace v. Parish, 122 U. 141, 247 P.2d 273 ( 1952) ........................ 33 
Peti v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P .2d 78, 45 
ALR ( 1954) .............................................................................. 16 
Sherwood v. South OCA Texas 29 S.W. 2d 805 (1930) ............ 34 
Smoot v. Lund Utah Supreme Court No. 9515, (Mar. 14, 
1962) ......... -........... -- ----·-- ... -... -... ·-- ......... -..... -·- -----.- --·. -· ...... ----.15-21 
Spangler v. Sellers, 5 Fed. 882, 887 (C. C. S.D. Ohio 1881) .... 23 
Struck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 U. 495, 227 P. 791 
( 1924) .. -..... -- ........... --·--- ............ ·--.- ..... -....... -..... --- .... ------·-······· ··- 33 
Re Swans Estate, 4 U.2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956) .................... 34 
Tangren v. Ingalls, 367 P .2d 179 ( 1961) .................................... 12-13 
Texas P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) ............................ 27 
Re Thompsons Estate, 72 U. 17, 260 P. 103 (1927) .................... 31 
Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham et ai., 11 U. 2d 159, 35'6 P. 
2d 281' ( 1960) ·············-------- ---·····----- ------ --······----------- --·-······----- 31 
Ward v. Arnold, 328 P .2d 164-6 Wash. ( 1958) -------·------------·------· 22 
Wilson v. Carroll, 80 ·Colo. 234, 250 P. 555 ( 1928) .................... 29 
STATUTES CITED 
UTAH 
U.C.A. 1953 Title 7'12-1 .. ·----------------------------·---------------------············· 25 
U.C.A. 1953 Title 77-15-1 ---··········------------------------·------··········-······· 24 
U .C.A. 1953 Title 77 -22-1 ........... ·-------------------·-------··----·-··················· 24 
U .C.A. 1953 Title 77 -22-13 .................... -----------------··········-----------·-·· 24 
U .C.A. 1953 Title 77 -22-15 .............................................................. 24 
U.C.A. 1953 Title 78-7-19 ............................................................ 4, 6-7 
U.C.A. 1953 Title 78-7 -20 ............................................................ 17-18 
U .C.A. 1953 Title 78-51-31.............................................................. 35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




Utah Constitution Art. I, Sec. 7------------------------------------------------------ 26 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11------------------------------------------------ 26 
United States Constitution, Amendment 5------------------------------------ 26 
United States Constitution XIVth Amendment ________________________ 26 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 8 (a)---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 8 (e)---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 8 (d)---------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 9 (b)---------------------------------------------------------------- 32 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 15 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 18---------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
U .R.~c.P. 1953 Rule 20-------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 14 (a) ( 1) ( i) ------------------------------------------------ 4 
U .R.C.P. 1953 Rule 52 (a)---------------------------------------------------------------- 31 
TEXTS AND AUTHORITIES 
American Law Review 45 ALR 58 __________________ ;. ....... ~--------------------- 16 
Prosser on Torts, ·2nd Edition, Violation of Statute, page 152 28 
Vender hilt Law Review, Vol. 12, page 77 4--------------------------------16-35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
II.\ RI{ 1r C. l-IE AT l-ll\1AN, 
fJ{a i u f iff and Llp pellant, I 
-vs.- \ 
Sl':\[Nl~R J. !lATCH, 
De.feudant and Respo-ndent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATTJRE OF CASE 
Case No. 
9593 
Thi:-:; is an action brought by the appellant to recover 
expen~e~, eosts, and da111ages for the negligent misrepre-
:sentation, breach of professional duty, betrayal of plain-
tiff's interests, and the "rillful fraud, deceit, and conspir-
acy of defendant in representing and advising plaintiff 
to hi~ drunage in 1natters of his defense against criminal 
charge~ wrongfully brought against plaintiff by County 
.. :\ttorney on con1plaint of one Ivan Bland, and defend-
ant's neglect and refusal to proceed in the recovery of 
n1oney due and enforcing plaintiff's possessory lien for 
""ork performed and material furnished upon vehicles 
allegedly o'vned by used car dealer, Ivan Bland. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOvVER ~COURT 
On the 20th day of Feb~ary, 1961, the complaint in 
this action 'vas filed, ( R. 1 to 6), and a motion to dismiss 
for more definite statement and to strike was filed by 
defendant !larch 13, 1961. (R. 7 to 8). Plaintiff filed 
notice of hearing May 18, 1961, noticed up defendant's 
motion to dismiss for hearing May 25, 1961 (R. 12 and 
13). On May 23, 1961, defendant filed ex parte motion 
and order (R. 14, 15, 18) continuing hearing to June 22, 
1961. Plaintiff filed motion (R. 20), Affidavit (R. 22), 
Order (R. 19), May 23, 1961. Plaintiff's motion granted, 
and hearing held May 25, 1961. Defendant's motion for 
more definite statement granted. Plaintiff filed amended 
complaint (R. 27) June 14, 1961. On June 13, 1961, plain-
tiff filed motion for summary judgment (R. 24) and 
notice of hearing. Court dismissed plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment on motion of plaintiff, June 22, 1961. 
Defendant moved court for 30 days to reply to amended 
complaint. Court granted 20 days, plaintiff moved court 
to amend amended complaint. Granted by court (R. 43). 
Defendant filed motion to dismiss (R. 46) July 12, 1961. 
Plaintiff filed second amended complaint July 17, 1961. 
Defendant filed Inotion to dismiss (R. 84 through 88) 
August 3, 1961. Plaintiff filed motion to strike. Notice 
of hearing (R. 90 through 93) September 28, 1961. Hear-
jng held October 17, 1961. Plaintiff's motion to strike 
denied. Motion to correct records denied (R. 94). ·Court 
entered order dated N ove1n ber 7, 1961 ( R. 95) dismissing 
plaintiff's second amended complaint "~ithout prejudice. 
Finding of faet and conclusions of la'v filed nunc pro 
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: ~ 
tunc January 23, 196~. ( R. 96 through 104). Plaintiff 
appeals Decetnber 5, 1961. (R. 102). 
R:BJLII1JF SOlT(;HT ON APPEAL 
l. Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable 
Court to vacate order (R. 23 and 164) dis1nissing District 
Court Case No. 128599, wrongfully entered in this cause 
as plaintiff's motion, and to strike sa1ne fro1n record. 
~- Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable 
Court to vacate and strike ~'findings of facts and conclu-
sions of la,y" entered nunc pro tuuc, January 23, 1962, 
in thi~ cause and declare same as void. (R. 96 through 
101). 
3. I~laintiff respectfully requests this court to disci-
pline .A.ttorneys Hatch and Jones, and to protect this 
plaintiff from further reprehensible and unlawful con-
duct and acts of .. A . ttorneys Hatch and Jones. 
4. Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the order dismissing 
his verified second amended complaint (R. 95) ; that the 
same be reinstated; that defendant be required to an-
s,ver; and that said cause be remanded to the T:hird Dis-
trict Court for trial and final determination on the merits, 
appellant being awarded costs on this ap·peal. 
5. Or in the alternative permission to amend his 
complaint in accordance with this court's instructions. 
STATEl\lENT OF FACTS 
The facts to support plaintiff's claim that order of 
disn1issal ( R. 23) ·Case 128599 and order ( R. 164) should 
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4 
be vacated and stricken from the record and declared 
void as a matter of law consist of the following: 
Plaintiff's notice of dismissal, Case No. 128599, as 
provided by Rule 41(A) (1) (i), U.R.C.P., as a result of 
plaintiff's inexperience and inadvertence was captioned 
"motion" instead of "notice''. (R. 157). 
On or about l\[arch 10, 1961, defendant's attorneys 
prepared prejudicial motion and order to dismiss (R. 170-
1-2), attached to the letter of defendant's attorneys dated 
~larch 10, 1961, and submitted same to the Honorable A. 
H. Ellett the follo,v·ing week for approval and signature. 
(The Honorable A. H. Ellett, recognizing said motion and 
order as an attempt to prejudice plaintiff's voluntary 
dismissal as an order of the Court granting dismissal, 
denied said motion and refused to sign said order. 
Defendant, through his attorneys on or about Janu-
ary 27, 1961, prepared an identical motion and order (R. 
163-4) as previously denied by Judge Ellett, and in the 
n1iddle of proceedings of this cause, ·Case X o. 129540, 
held :nray 25, 1961, without a court reporter and over 
protests of plaintiff, without having the file of Case No. 
128599 or the matter properly before the court, or mo-
tion and order properly served and noticed upon plain-
tiff as required by U.R.C.P. after a n1otion for order is 
denied by the Court and a direct violation of Title 78-7-
19, u.c·.A. 1953, and over objections of plaintiff, pre-
sented said motion and order to the Honorable Maurice 
J. Harding and obtained Judge Harding's signature on 
s.aid prejudicial order, Case No. 128599. (R. 164) Order. 
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Said l\[inute Entry and Order, Case Xo. 129540, (R. 
~;~, line~ 10 and 11) reciting that order was signed on 
plaintiff's 1notion i8 a fabrication. n[otion and order (R. 
163-4) are plainly defendant's. 
The facts are adequately presented m this record 
that the- plaintiff has complied with the orders of the 
Court, and it is plain fro1n the record that the order of 
the Court dis1nissing plaintiff's second amended com-
plaint filed in this cause November 9, 1961, (R. 95), is 
a con1plete fallacy. There is no such order filed in this 
cause: 
''Order of the court, requiring plaintiff to state 
the farts of his alleged cause of action in plain 
and concise terms", 
as grounds for said order of dismissal a certified by 
Clerk ,s eertificate (R. 112). 
That the only matte-rs properly before the court to 
support. dismissal of plaintiff's verified second amended 
complaint 'vere defendant's motion to dismiss, motion 
for more definite statement, and motion to strike, filed 
~larch 13, 1961 (R. 7-8, par. 2) and defendant's motion 
to dismiss, filed August 3, 1961, (R. 84, 85, 86, 87, 88). 
The facts plaintiff is depending upon to fully contro-
vert Allegations 1 through and including 7 (R. 84, 85, 
86), as recited in defendant's motion to dismiss, directed 
against plaintiff's second amended complaint (R. 84, 89) 
together 'vith facts relied upon by plaintiff to sup·port 
his request that by la"'" he is entitled to protection from 
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6 
the illegal acts, doings, and omissions of Attorney Jones 
are contained in transcript of proceedings of District 
Court Case No. 12859·9 (R. 177) and consist of Jones' 
unethical conduct in calling the Honorable Judge A. H. 
Ellett and deceiving Judge as to timely Inailing of a 
motion directed against plaintiff's complaint, thereby 
obtaining Judge's agreement and action to orally order 
and instruct Clerk of the Court not to sign and enter 
plaintiff's default judgment as provided by law (R. 177, 
page 44, lines 9-30; pages 45, 46, 4 7 to line 28) Transcript 
of testimony and proceedings on motion to strike entry 
of default, and further, defendant and attorneys impro~ 
er and unethical conduct in deceiving plaintiff and court 
with the false affidavit of Kathleen ·Cholley (R. 122) and 
willfully neglecting and refusing to 'vithdraw said affi-
davit, and defendant and attorneys attempting to con-
ceal said fabrication by tricks and fraud in willfully 
advising prop·erly subpoenaed witness (R. 123, 129, 128) 
not to appear in court, and withholding said witness from 
plain tiff ( R. 177, page 4, line 30 ; page 5, lines 1 to 30 ; 
page 7, line 18 ; pages 8 and 9 ; page 10, lines 1 to 15), 
and further obtaining cooperation of Clerk of the Court 
in interrup·ting cross-examination of witness by plaintiff 
at critical point of witness entrapment and then instruct-
ing witness and securing time for her recomposure (R. 
177, page 25, lines 23 to 30), and defendant and attorney 
misconduct and violation of Title 78-7-19, U.C.A.1953, (R. 
23, lines 10-11). 
The facts relied upon in prosecution of the appeal as 
to sufficiency of plaintiff's second amended complaint 
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( R. -l-R incl. 83) are particularly set out in both first and 
second cause of action. The allegations are that the de-
fendant Hatch was engaged by this plaintiff IIeathman · 
on or about September 6, 1960, (R. 48 and 49, Allegation 
K o. 3), to defend him against a felony complaint "''Tong-
fully brought again~t p1aintiff by one Ivan Bland Sep-
ternber :2, 1960, and to foreclose plaintiff's possessory 
and rnechanic's lien and on the alleged personal property 
of Ivan Bland (R. 49). 
It is further alleged that defendant conspired with 
Chief Cri1ninal Deputy County Attorney Richard C. Dib-
hlee to frame plaintiff on the charge of Ernbezzle1nent 
and Grand Larceny and defendant exercised forbearance 
and consent in allo"'ring plaintiff to be bound to the Third 
District Court on a felony charge, City Court Case No. 
38158 ( R.. 50, Allegation No. 4), "~Tongfully extended 
and enlarged on different facts and circumstances than 
contained in original complaint Case No. 38052 (R. 50), 
and that defendant did, in fact, allow plaintiff to be 
bound to the Third District Court upon Case No. 38158 
'vithout a City c·ourt arraignment or being served a copy 
of cornplaint 'vithout a prelirninary hearing; that defend-
ant had ample time and opportunity to p·roperly perform 
as agreed 'vith p1aintiff and to properly defend plaintiff. 
It is alleged defendant failed in all particulars of his 
agreement to defend and represent plaintiff (R. 51 and 
52) and the facts of defendant's breach of professional 
duty and betrayal of plaintiff's interests are alleged 
(R. 52 and 53). 
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It is further alleged defendant deceived plaintiff by 
Inisstatement and n1isrepresentation that plaintiff had 
been bound to the Third District Court on complaint No. 
38052 rather than complaint No. 38158, and withheld 
from plaintiff that he had been bound to the court on 
co1nplaint K o. 38158, and further deceived plaintiff by 
advising him that he was properly bound to the District 
Court and that there was no remedy at law to vacate 
said bind over and to quash information No. 17135 filed 
in district court and further advised plaintiff he must 
plead to said information, defendant ,,~ell knowing this 
would result in plaintiff waiving his rights to protest 
or contest any irregularities prior to District Court ar-
raignment (R. 53). 
It is furter alleged that defendant "\Yell lmew of the 
proper legal remedy to vacate said bind over and refused 
to exercise ordinary prudence, skill, and kno"\\~ledge in 
plaintiff's behalf, and well lmew plaintiff had a right 
to rely on him, and did so rely on hin1, to plaintiff's dam-
age and detriment. 
It is further alleged on or about October 13, 1960, 
that plaintiff, learning of defendant's breach of profes-
sional duty, betrayal or plaintiff's interests, negligent 
misrepresentation and conspiracy discharged defendant, 
and being unable to scclere legal counsel plaintiff, per 
se, went to the Supreme Court, back to the District Court, 
on or about Dece1nber 22, 1960, there obtaining (1) Dis-
trict C'ourt order (R .. 54) vacating order of Marcellus 
J{. Sno\\'", J ud'ge, binding hiln to the District Court on 
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Case Ko. 381r>S; (~)order quashing information No. 
171~)5 filed in District Court as a result of being bound 
over on Case 1\ o. 38158 ; and ( 3) order for a preliminary 
hPa ring in C1ity Court Case No. 38158. 
lt is furthPr alleged plaintiff, defending himself, se-
('ured his o'vn discharge and dismissal at preliminary 
hearing, held ~fay 10 and 11, 1961, (R. 55) at which time 
the trial court found there was no probable cause for 
( \nnplaint No. 38158 in the first instance. 
It is further alleged on or about October 7, 1960, 
defendant failed and refused to follow reasonable and 
propPr instructions of plaintiff, to plaintiff's detriment 
and da1nage ( R. 55-60). 
It is further alleged defendant on or about October 
10, 1960, after unreasonable procrastination, prep~ared 
a void notice of sale to plaintiff's detriment and damage 
( R. 57 and 58), said notice of sale made a part of com-
plaint (R. 42). 
It is further alleged in particular special damages 
suffered by plaintiff ( R. 61, 62, 63), as a result of the 
1nisconduct, misrepresentation, breach of professional 
duty, betrayal of p~laintiff's interests, failure and refusal 
to exercise proper skill by defendant. 
The facts of the impropriety of the filing of findings 
of facts and conclusions of law (R. 96-7-8-9), 101) are 
Yery apparent in this record. 
That the prejudicial findings of facts and conclusions 
of la\\T (R. 96, 101) are void as a matter of law and im-
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properly presented to the court January 23, 1962, by 
Attorney Jones during the proceedings and hearing on 
Case No. 132540 (R. 234) by his usual improper conduct 
( R. 23-!, page 6, line 29; page 7, lines 1 to 17) and signed 
and filed by Judge l\faurice Harding on January 23, 
1962, 'vhen the Judge con1pletely lacked jurisdiction of 
the case, the parties, and the subject matter. Judge 
Harding signed said findings after he had disqualified 
himself in Case No. 129540 ( R. 234, page 17, lines 19 and 
20). JudgH Harding, being a Fourth District Judge, com-
pletely disqualified himself to sign any matter without 
proper invitation froin the Presiding Judge of the Third 
District Court after he had denied jurisdiction of case. 
That nunc pro tttnc is not a v.alid or proper procedure 
for pre-dating and filing of findings of facts and con-
clusions of law and that findings of facts and conclusions 
of law must issue before judgment or order as a matter 
of la,v, dismissal order dated November 7, 1961 (R. 95). 
The facts of defendant's w·illful knowing fraud, de-
ceit, conspiraey, and malicious misrepresentation are 
adequately set out with particularity in plaintiff's sec-
ond cause of action (R. 63 to 73, incl.). The allegations 
in No. I (R. 63), No. II (R. 63-69), No. III R. 69-
70), No. I\7 (R. 74), No. \T. (R. 72-73) state the facts 
of defendant's 'villful and knowing betrayal of plain-
tiff's interests and his deliberate fabrications to deceive 
and conceal the true f·acts from plaintiff of defendant's 
fraud and conspiracy with Richard C. Dibblee and others 
in allo,ving plaintiff to be 1mlawfully bound over to the 
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rrhird District Court. It is further alleged willful breach 
of profPssional duty itnposed by la"~ in defendant's will-
ful refusal and failure to exercise a reasonable standard 
of proft\s~ional skill in plaintiff's behalf in all matters 
entrusted to him and using his fiduciary position to 
conceal the true facts frorn plantiff. The true facts are 
fully stated in each allegation as to defendant's fraud, 
deceit, conspiracy and willful fabrications. 
The legal claitns asserted in plaintiff's se:cond 
a1nended complaint and contained in the record are 
treated in the argument herein. 
It i~ very apparent front the record that defendant 
and his attorney's motion to dis1niss (R. 84 incl. 88) is 
frivolous, deceiving, without foundation in law, and in-
tended to confuse plaintiff, and a devise to stall for time 
and to lead this plaintiff into fatal error in law. 
ARGU~fENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLATE COUR·T MUST VIEW THE RECORD 
IN A MANNER MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court in dismissing plaintiff's second 
amended complaint based upon defendant's motion to 
dismiss (R. 84) could only issue as a result of defend-
ant having deceived the court; however, it appearing 
fron1 the record that the matters recited in defendant's 
motion to dismiss, for more definite statement, and to 
strike of March 3, 1961, were before the court at hearing 
October 17, 1961, more particularly defendant's allega-
tion that co1nplaint fails to state a claim upon which 
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relief can be ·gran ted ( R. 7). No ans,ver was ever filed, 
nor does the court's order reflect the true grounds or 
basis for its holding. (R. 95). 
It ap·pears the court ruling must be considered to 
have encon1passed all the grounds presented by defend-
ant's motions. Before the ruling of the court may be af-
firmed, it must appear that the plaintiff's complaint 
when considered in a light most favorable to the· plain-
tiff under any set of facts stated in the complaint could 
not state a claim for relief at la,v, or that n1isjoinder of 
issues and damage is a valid grounds for dismissal. 
In Tangreen 1;. Ingalls, Supren1e Court of Utah, No. 
9297, November 30, 1961, 367 P. ~d 179, the Court stated 
as follows: 
• "The sust~ining of sununary n1otions "~thout 
affording the party an opportunity to p·resent his 
evidence is a stringent measure 'vhich Courts 
should be reluctant to grant. It should be horne 
in mind that although disposing of a case on such 
a motion may seem an easy and expeditious meth-
od of dealing 'Yith litigation it 1nay not in fact 
be so. 
''l; nless the Court feels a high degree of assur-
ance that such ruling is correct it n1ay result in 
defeating that purpose and actually protracting 
the litigation by requiring an appeal and then 
having a trial 'Yhich ~hould have been done in the 
first plaee . .:\ccordingly the privilege of present-
ing evidence should be denied only 'vhen taking 
the vie'v most favorable to the party's clain1 he 
eould not in any event establish a right to redress 
under the la'v; and unless it clearly so appears, 
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doubts should be resolved in favor of pern1itting 
hin1 to go to trial." 
In I.Jiqnor Cootrol CoJJuuissiuu v. Athas, 121 Utah 
-t;>:L -l- ~-t:~ P.~d -1--1-1 (lD;-):2), the Court stated as follo,vs: 
H..:\ n1otion to dismi~s should not be granted tu1less 
it appears to a certainty that plaintiff "~ould be 
entitled to no relief under any state of facts that 
rould be proved in support of its claim." 
rfhe ( ~ourt furthPr noted that a elairn could be p.Jeaded 
hy Hrecitation of a conclusions of la\r or fact or both." 
·To the degree that defendant's 1notion 'vas based upon 
insuffi<'iene:~ of the co1nplaint to state a cause, it is con-
trary to the above rules. 
Jllaintiff subn1its that his second amended complaint 
( R. ±8 to 63) first cause of action clearly states a claim 
for relief well "Tithin the rule of the Tangren b. Ingalls 
rase and the Liquor ·Control Commission case and the 
trial court erred in not so finding. 
_Ho"Tever, plaintiff submits even though the second 
amended complaint may be somewhat lengthy and not 
couched in professional language, as might have been 
done by a person learned in the law, yet the facts alleged 
constitute a legal "Trong resulting in damages accruing 
to plaintiff and reflect a meritorious case against de-
fendant as a matter of law and are a result of plaintiff's 
unprofessional efforts to inform the trial court and de-
fendant of the 'vTongs suffered by this plaintiff at the 
hand~ of a skilled attorney who betrayed plaintiff and 
the trust plaintiff had deposed in defendant. Plaintiff 
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submits that Allegation No. 4, first cause of action, and 
Allegation No. II, second cause of action are somewhat 
as this Honorable Court said in its decision February 
5, 1958, McGavin v. Preferred Inc. Excl1t0/n.ge, 7 Utah 
2d 161, 320 P2d 1109 : 
''The dismissal was bottomed on failure to state 
a clairn on which relief could be granted. The com-
plaint is somewhat prolix and is to a great ex-
tent a recitation of evidence, rather than being 
a short, concise, statement of a claim, as contem-
plated by our rules of procedure.1 It sounds part-
ly in contract and partly in deceit, with no sepa-
rate statements in counts or paragraphs, as in-
dependent claims. The claims for general damages 
and punitive damage are mingled, the former for 
breach of contract and the latter presumably aris-
ing out of tort. 'Vithout separation as a distinct 
claim, there is a hint in some of the language of 
a claim for service performed, not arising out 
of an express promise. 
''Since the dismissal was without prejudice, it 
seems obvious that, whatever claim plaintiff has 
'vould be pursued in another action, if not, in 
this one. It would seem reasonable and sensible 
therefore, and would expedite the matter consid-
erably, if plaintiff were permitted to redraft his 
pleadings within the spirit of Rule 15, U.R.c·.P. 
along lines suggested in this opinion. . .. " 
But in this instant case plaintiff is a layman and felt it 
his duty to explain as best he could the particulars of 
defendant's breaeh of duty, and the fraud, d·eceit and 
1. Rule 8(A), 8(E), U.R.C.P. 1953. 
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eonsptra<'y 1n second cause of action. Plaintiff submits 
a rea~onable 1nan could answer thi~ complaint or any 
part of it, if it "·ere not for defendant being responsible 
at law for all the damage and injury claimed hy plain-
tiff. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLATE COURT l\iUST CONSIDER ALL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
TRUE AS TO BOTH FIRST AND SECOND CAUSE OF AC-
TION. 
rrhP trial COUrt should have COnsidered plaintiff's 
co1nplain t true in all particulars as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff's verified second amended complaint (R. 48-
83) 1nust be controverted or denied by a verified answer 
or defense: and Rule No. 8(d) lT.R.C.P., EFFECT OF 
:FAIIJ1JRE TO DENY: 
HAver1nents in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the 
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied 
in the responsive pleading. . . . " 
Plaintiff cites the case of Smoot v. Lund, Supreme 
Court, No. 9515, l\!arch 14, 1962, in which a plaintiff's 
seeond cause of action was dismissed on a motion for 
sturunary judgment. Among other things, the court said: 
"\Ve turn to an examination of the plaintiff's 
claims to see whether a right to recovery could 
be made out, assuming the facts to be as they con-
tend.'' 
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Plaintiff respectfully submits had the trial court con-
8idered plaintiff's second amended complaint as true, 
court could not have dismissed plaintiff's complaint as 
a rnatter of law. 
POINT III. 
TI-IAT COURT ERRED IN DISl'.1ISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAIN·T WITHOUT ALLOWING 
SAME TO BE AMENDED IF IT IS INSUFFICIENT, AND 
ERRED IN NOT FULLY ·CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF COULD 
NOT OBTAIN AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HIM, AND 
THAT COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN 
BEHALF OF LAYMAN. 
Plaintiff submits that crying layman can appear that 
one is taking advantage of a non-professional standing; 
ho"rever, the la-\v also recognizes the difficulties a lay-
man experiences in obtaining an attorney to properly 
represent him in an action against another attorney, 
-vanderbilt Lau' Review, vol. 12, p. 77 ±, and also recog-
nizes that the trial court should exercise all its discre-
tion in favor of the plaintiff layman even to allowing 
amendments to complaint to correct fatal error. 
The California Supreme ·Court said as follows, on the 
above subject, in Pete v. Henderson (1954) 12± Cal. App. 
2d 487, 269 P~d 78, 45 ALR 2d 58, 
" ... where it appears that the plaintiff a layman 
was trying the case in person because of the im-
possibility of securing an attorney to represent 
him .... That fact should be considered in deter-
rnining whether the trial court should exercise any 
discretion it may have to grant relief from a par-
ticular default. That discretion should be exer-
cised.'' 
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I>laintiff re~}H)ctfully submits that trial court erred 
1n not fully con~i<lering plaintiff's almost insurmount-
able lPgal obstacles and in not making allo"~ances for 
plaintiff's inexperience and not learned efforts at law 
to eonstruct his complaint and erred in failing to exer-
cise court's discretion in behalf of plan tiff. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING OR-
DER MAY 25, 1961, IN THIS CAUSE, CASE NO. 1295'40, DIS-
~IISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IN DISTRI,CT COURT 
CASE NO. 128599. 
Plaintiff submits that said order entered May 25, 
1961' in ca~e N" 0. 128599· in the middle of proceedings 
held in this cause, Case No. 129540 (R. ~3, lines 10-11 and 
R. 164) \Yas a trick of defendant and attorney to obtain 
an order of the court dismissing plaintiff's cause in 
Ca~e K o. 128599, and a direct violation of Title 78-7-19, 
REPI~~~\TED ~\PPLICATIO~ FOR ORDERS l11 0R-
BIDDEN, and that the attorney \Yell kne\v he \vas taking 
advantage of plaintiff and \vell kne\v the i1npropriety of 
taking the n1atter before Judge Harding after his motion 
had been denied by Judge Ellett. (R. 170-1-2) Defend 
ant and his attorney were obviously taking ad-
vantage of the fact that said hearing was not reported 
as thi~ plaintiff had requested and de1nanded of ·Clerk 
of the ( 10urt, and defendant and attorney well knew 
the i1npropriety of bringing the subject matter before 
the court \vithout motion being properly noticed and 
properly before the court and particularly during the 
proceeding of another hearing, and that attorney and 
defendant should be punished according to Title 78-7-20, 
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DISOBEDIENCE, C'ONTEl\IPT. This Honorable Court 
has recently said in Hackford v. Indu,strial Commission, 
{Sept. 28, 1961) 364 P2d 1091 : 
'~The trial of disputes, whether before courts or 
administrative tribunals is not a game of tricks 
but is a proceeding purposed to find the truth on 
contested issues of facts and to correctly apply 
the la\Y thereto.'' 
~ehis plaintiff submits that all he wants is to go for-
ward into the merits of this case, if the defendant can 
~ontest the issues present in complaint, however crude 
they 1nay be. Plaintiff submits that trial court e.rred in 
entering an order dismissing his complaint in Case No. 
128599 (R. 23 and 164). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that said order should 
be voided and stricken, pursuant to Title 78-7-20, as a 
nu1tter of law. 
POINT V. 
'THE APPELLATE COURT IN ABSENCE OF STAiTE 
BARR ASSOCIATIO·N ACTING ·OR PERFORMING ITS DUTY 
SHOULD DISCIPLINE A·T'TORNEYS HkTCH AND JONES 
AND PROTECT T'HIS PLAINTIFF FROM THEIR FURTHER 
MICONDUGT UPON THE FOLLOWING TWO THEORIES: 
A. APPELLATE 'COURT HAS THE ABSOLUTE AND 
FINAL JURISDICTION O·F DISCIPLINING ATTOR-
NEYS. 
B. APPELLANT HAS RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM 
ATTORNEYS IN THEIR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF 
ST'ATU'TES AND CANNON OF RULES OF ETHICS 
ON ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT. 
Plaintiff submits that he has tried repeatedly to ob-
tain protection from Attorneys Jones and Hatch's 'mis-
eonduct from the court and the State Bar Association. 
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"fhis plaintiff is no'v so disgusted and discouraged and 
plaintiff no\\· has only contempt and pity for such breach 
of professional duty that is apparent in this record, and 
prays the court to examine this entire record for the 
1nisconduct and breach of ethics apparent herein, and if 
for no oher reason than to protect the rest of the citi-
zpns of the State of Utah and the State Bar Association 
itself fron1 the reprehensible action of Attorneys Jones 
and Hatch. 
This Honorable Court, amongst other things, said as 
follows on this subject in Re J.lf acl?alane (April 1, 1960) 
10 1Jtah 2d 217, 350 P2d 631: 
~' ... \V e accept the fact that the final responsibil-
ity is upon this court and that this involves more 
than 1nere rubber stamp endorsement of the ac-
tions of the commission ... in the p-rudent exer-
cise of the power to discipline in order to 1naintain 
such standards lies the protection of the public 
and The Bar itself." 
POINT VI 
·THAT COURT ERRED IN ITS DE'TERMINATION BY 
ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1961, DISlVIISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT "FOR F AlLURE 
OF THE PLAINTIFF TO COMPLY WITH ORDER OF THE 
COURT REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO STATE THE FA·CTS 
OF HIS ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION IN PLAINT AND 
CONCISE TERMS". NO SUCH ORDER OR ENTRY MADE 
IN THIS CAUSE. 
Plaintiff submits the trial court erred in entering 
order (R. 95). ·The record is definite as reflected by the 
certificate of the Clerk of the Court (R. 112) that no 
such order was made in this cause. As a matter of law it 
is \vell established that there is a proper method for the 
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court to enter an order, and this Honorable Court has 
frequently held that the trial courts must use the proper 
methods, prescribed by law. This Honorable Court said 
in Butting Tractor v. Ford, 272 P2d 191: 
"In entering any judgment it is the duty of the 
Court to make such order not inconsistent with 
law as "\Viii effectuate justice.'' 
rrhe court said in Attorney General v Pomeroy, October 
27, 1937, 93 U 426 73 P2d 1277 : 
''An order will not be construed as going beyond 
the motion in pursuant of which it is given.'' 
POINT VII 
'THE APPELLANT'S FIRST CAUSE IN TORT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT ADEQUATELY S'TATES A PRIMA 
FACIE CAUSE AND CLAIM FOR RELIEF ON THE FOL-
LOWING THEORIES: 
A. AN AT'TORNEY IS LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR NEG-
LIGENCE, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, 
MISCONDUCT, AND BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL 
DUTY IMPOSED BY LAW 
B. THAT DEFENDANT LAWYER VIO·LATED THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
1THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STA'TE OF UTAH 
AND THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DESIGNED T·O PROTECT THE LIBERTY AND 
PROPERTY OF PLAINTIFF, THE EQUAL RIGH·TS 
AND DUE PRO'CESS OF LAW INTENDED T·O PRO-
TECT PLAIN'TIFF. 
B(l) THAT TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL VIOLA1TED 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR 
ABOVE REASONS 
Plaintiff alleges the first cause of action in his second 
amended complaint adequately states a claim for relief 
in tort on negHgence~ negligent 1nisrepresentation~ and 
consp1rary. 
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This II onorable Court recently held in J(inzika Tonza, 
A(llninistri.r, v. Utah Power and Light Conzpauy, ;j();) I). 
2d 788, Supreme Court 9402, October 26, 1961: 
HA tort is a legal wrong committed by one against 
the person or property of another. It is the viola-
tion of a duty imposed by law. Three elements of 
every tort action are : ( 1) Existence of a legal 
duty from defendant to plaintiff; (2) Breach of 
that duty; (3) Damage as a p·roximate result. It 
may arise by the violation of the duty in a given 
transaction or by invasion of some public duty 
by \\rhich damages accrue to the individual." 
It is alleged in plaintiff's complaint that plaintiff 
had entrusted to defendant all 1natters of his defense 
and affairs; that plaintiff had a right to rely on de-
fendant, did rel~r on hin1 and "\Vas injured by so relying 
and that defendant had proper time and opportunity to 
adequately represent plaintiff, and that plaintiff suf-
fered damage by defendant's breach of trust. 
This Honorable Court said ~farch 1-1, 196~, in Sn1oot 
1.'. L1ln.d_. Supreme Court Case No. 9515 : 
u\Vhere an atorney is hired solely to represent the 
interests of a client, his fiduciary responsibility 
is of th0 highest order and he must not represent 
interests adverse to those of the client. It is also 
true that because of his professional responsibil-
itY and the confidence and trust which his client 
:m:ay legitimately repose in him, he must adhere to 
a lrigh standard of honesty and integrity in deal-
ing with his client. He is not permitted to take 
advantage of his position or superior knowledge 
to impose upon the client; nor to conceal facts or 
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law, nor in any way deceive him 'vithout being 
held responsible therefor.'' 
Now the court'~ attention is respectfully called to 
the case of Iiodges v. Carter, 239 l\.C. 517, 80 S.E. 2d 
144, 146, 1954, that a lawyer: 
" ... is answerable in damages for any loss to his 
client which proximately results from a want of 
that degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily pos-
sessed by others of his profession similarly situ-
ated, or from the omission to use reasonable care 
and diligence, or from the failure to exercise in 
good faith his best judgment in attending to the 
litigation committed to his care." 




••• that client's caus·e of action is upon his breach 
of professional duty and would exist though 
breach unintentional.'' 
The c.ourt's attention is directed to t"?o recent Pacific 
cases "?hich hold that if the attorney's erroneous acts 
and advice W'"ere a proximate cause of the injury, recov-
ery can be had. Modica 1;. Crist, 102 Cal. 2d, 144, 146, 276 
P2d, 61-t- (1954), Ward v. Arnold, 328 P 2d, 164, 166 
(Wash. 1958) :recite: 
''. . . the law does not require that negligence 
of the defendant must be the sole cause. . . . We 
see no sound reason . . . why the degree of causa-
tion which must be proved in an action for dam-
ages for malpractice should be any different from 
that required in an ordinary negligence case.'' 
Plaintiff sub1nits defendant is a skilled attorney-at-
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la"·, in fa<'t, is kno\\·n as a erirnina.l attorney 'veil versed 
in the erirninal ~tatute~. ~ o'v the court's attention is 
respectfully ealled to the leading ease in point, widely 
quoted, S pan~qler v. Seller.s 5 Fed. 882, 887 ( C.C.S.D. 
Ohio 1881) and the recent case of Hodges v. Carter 
239N.C. 517, 80 S.E. 2d 144, 146 (1954) that a lawyer 
" ... is answerable in damages for any loss to his 
client which proximately results from a want of 
that degree of skill in relation to business of that 
character, nor that he would conduct it with the 
greatest degree of diligence, care, and prudence. 
But it required that he should possess the ordi-
nary legal knowledge and skill common to mem-
. bers of the profession and that, in the discharge 
of the duties he had assumed, he would be ordi-
narily and reasonably diligent, careful, and pru-
dent." 
It is submitted that the defendant is liable to the 
plaintiff in the first cause of action of his complaint in 
negligence based upon the facts alleged as a matter of 
la,v, based upon defendant's misconduct, breach of pro-
fessional duty imposed by la,v, failure to exercise due 
rare, ordinary prud'ence and skill in client's behalf. 
_._\. XEGLIGEXT ~IISREPRESENTATION 
It is submitted that the misstatements, omissions, 
nondisclosure, and misrepresentation, as alleged in the 
complaint, give rise to an additional cause of action, 
base upon negligence. The law has recognized that a 
tort action on the basis of negligence may arise from a 
negligent misrepresentation. However, plaintiff recog-
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nizes it is debatable whether the facts as pleaded cover-
ing nondisclosure, misstatement and misrepresentation, 
in plaintiff's first cause of action, should be treated as 
neglgence or fraud; in any event it is submitted that 
defendant is liable to plaintiff for damages based on neg-
ligent misrepresentation. It is held in Cornell v. Edien 
78 Wash. 662 139P 602, (1914) appeal from judgment 
on pleadings, Supreme Court said: 
''Where an attorney wrongfully dismissed a 
cause of action . . . his client's cause of action 
depend's not upon his fraud and m,isrepresentation 
of an adverse verdict but upon his breach of pro-
fessional duty and "rould exist though breach 
'vas unintentional.'' 
B. NEGLIGENC'E PREDICATED ON \TIOLA-
TION OF---~ STATUTE EXAC·TED FOR PRO-
TECTION" OF PL.1:\INTIFF. 
It is alleged in plaintiff's second amended complaint 
that defendant negligently and ,~vrongfully allo,ved plain-
tiff to be bound over to the District ·Court 'vi thout an 
arraign1nent, a violation of ·Title 77-22-1, l 1.C.A. 1953, 
'vithout being served a copy of the coinplaint, a viola-
tion of Title 77-22-13, lT.C.A. 1953, or having a day set 
for a preli1ninary hearing or ""'aiving same, Title 77-22-15, 
or being allowed to have a preliminary hearing, a vio-
lation of Title 77-15-1, lT.C.A. 1953, (R. 50, 51, 52). 
Plaintiff sub1nits the aforementioned' statutes 'vere 
enacted to protect the equal rights and the due process 
clauses of t.he Constitutions of the l ... nited States and 
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of the ~tatP of l Ttah for the protection of persons accused 
of a felony, a class of 'vhich this plaintiff was at that 
t i1ne. 
It is further alleged defendant conspired with Chief 
c•ri1ninal Deput~· ·County .Lt\.ttorney Richard C. Dibblee 
(R. 51, 52), a violation of Title 7£-12-1, lT.C.A. 1953, 
CJ{I~iiNAL CONSPIRACY, defined: 
1. If t'vo or more persons conspire; 
1. To eom1nit a crime; or 
2. Falsely and maliciously to indict or convict 
another for any crime, or to rnove or ma.1:n-
tatn any suvt, action, or proceedings; or, 
3. Falsely to move or maintat"'n any suit, action 
or proceedings; or 
4-. To cheat and defraud any person of any prop·-
erty by any means which are in themselves 
criminal, or by any means which if executed 
would amount to a cheat, or to the obtaining 
of money or property by false pretenses; or 
5. To commit .any act ... for the perversvon· or 
obstruction of j-ustice or the due administra-
tion of the laws; they are punishable by im-
prisonment in the county jail, not exceeding 
one year, or by fine not exceeding $1,000. 
!There can be no doubt that each of the forementioned 
statutes "Tere violated by the defendant; that the plain-
tiff \Yas a person of the class said statutes were meant 
to protect ~ and that the plaintiff was a victim of the 
very 'vrongs the statutes \\.,.ere meant to prevent. 
It surely goes \Yithout saying the above statutes were 
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enacted and based upon The Constitution of the United 
States, Amendment V : 
''. . . No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law, ... " 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Sec-
tion 7, which provides : 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of Ia" .. ·'' 
and that the trial court's disn1issal of plaintiff's second 
amended complaint was a flagrant violation of the laws 
of the State of Utah and a violation of our State Cnsti-
tution which provides in Article I, Section 11 : 
''All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for injury done to him jn his person or repu-
tation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without d'enial or 
unnecessary delay, and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party." 
and a violation of plaintiff's rights in the Constitution 
of the United States that provides, Amendment XIV: 
"T:hat no state shall deprive any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law 
or deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
'vithout due process of law." 
Due process of la'v i8 defined in Hager v. Reclamation 
Dist~rirf as follov{s, Supra III US 708: 
''By due process is meant one which follow-
ing the forms of Ia" .. , is appropriate to the case. 
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.· .. lt rnust be pursued in the ordinary mode pre-
scribed by law; it must be adapted to the end 
to be attained .... The clause in question means, 
therefore, that there can be no proceeding against 
life, liberty, or property which 1nay result in the 
deprivation of either, without the observance of 
those general rules established in our system of 
jurisprudence for the security of private rights.'' 
It is admitted the afore1nentioned l~tah statutes are 
criminal statutes; ho,vever, this does not preclude a civil 
remedy being based upon a violation thereof which is 
the proxi1nate cause of plaintiff's damages. It "·as noted 
in Texas P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) as 
follows: 
~'A disregard of the command of the statutes 
is a "·rongful act, and where i't results in damage 
to one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted, the right to recover damages 
from the party in default is implied.'' 
This Honorable Court indicated in Langlois v. Rees, 
10 U. ~d 272-5, 351 P. 2d 638 ( 1960) that if a violation 
of a statute results in damage ·w-hich the statute is de-
signed to prevent, a supportable cause of action exists. 
Notwithstanding this case deals with violation of the 
statutes as to pedestrian and motor vehicle code and 
resulting personal injuries, plaintiff finds little. diffi-
culty in choosing 'vhether it is more desirable to be 
personally injured by a negligently operated vehicle or 
by the acts~ doings, and omissions of a negligent attor-
ney; this plaintiff survived a near fatal truck accident 
and personally knowing it 'vas forgotten after recovery; 
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whereas, the disgrace, oppression, shame, ridicule, and 
stigma of being branded a felon and other injuries have 
lingered on, long after the stomach ulcer quit bleeding 
and healed. The said ulcer \Yas developed and aggra-
vated as a result of the unusual frustrations, mental 
sufferings caused by defendant's violation of the stat-
utes desi·gned to protect plaintiff from just such wrongs, 
and resulting damage as plaintiff sets out in his com-
plaint. This may not be law but it is the truth, good 
sense, and I surely intend to try and make some law 
out of it. 
It is difficult to construe the conduct of defendant 
as that of a reasonable man and more particularly so 
as a skilled attorney, as noted in Prosser, TORTS, 
second edition, page 152: 
"The standard of conduct of a reasonable man 
may be established by a statute or ordinance. 
The violation of such a legislative enactment may 
be negligence in itself if: (A) ·The plaintiff is 
one of a class of persons v.rhom the statute was 
intended to protect, and (B) The harm 'vhieh 
has occurred is of the type 'vhich it was intended 
to prevent." 
Plaintiff sub1nits the breach of the aforementioned 
statutes by the defendant appear obvious from the 
pleadings and that defendant is liable to plaintiff for 
damages for negligence based on violation of a statute 
as a matter of la,Y. Plaintiff contends the court erred 
in dismissing his first cause of action in his second 
amended co1nplaint for said reason and in particular 
that said disnlissal violates plaintiff's c·onstitutional 
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righ1~ in both the Constitutions of the l ~nited States 
and the State of r:-tah, as heretofore set forth. 
POINT VIII 
THAT PLAINTIFF, A LAYMAN N'OT SKILLED AND 
NOT LEARNED IN THE LAW, PREVAILED IN ALL MAT-
TERS OF HIS DEFENSE WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED. 
It i~ subn1ittPd that plaintiff's second amended com-
plaint, first cause of action, sets out p~laintiff prevailed 
in the san1e matters that defendant neglected and failed 
(R. 54) first cause, (R. 68 and 69) second cause of action. 
Inasmuch as this point is the main defense unscrupulous 
at~tornPys use as a 1natter of law to avoid having to 
an~\\·t~r for their \vrongdoings, I shall let the defense 
elaborate on this point at law. The complaint speaks 
for itself on this point. 
POINT IX 
THAT DEFENDANT PREPARED A VOID NOTICE OF 
SALE IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF. 
That defendant prepared a void notice of sale (R. 56) 
allegation No. 6, first cause, as allegated in complaint 
No. , ... (R. 72') second cause, there is no doubt. Said 
notice of sale is made a part of complaint (R. 42). It is 
held in Wilson v. Carroll, 80 Colo. 234, 250 P. 555 (1926) 
that an attorney can be held negligent in conduct of 
litigation from error in publication of notice of sale. 
Allegation No. V, second cause of action, adequately 
alleges fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation and 
damage arising therefrom. 
POINT X 
THAT DEFENDANT FAILED AND REFUSED TO FOL-
LOW PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE IN·STRU·CTIONS. 
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An attorney has been held negligent in conduct of 
litigation from failure to follow client's instructions (R. 
55) allegation No. 5, first cause. 
(R. 69) Allegation III and (R. 71) Allegation IV, 
second cause of action, adequately alleges fraud and 
fraudulent tnisrepresentation, and damages ar1smg 
therefrom. Lally v. K1tster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 Pac. 96 
(1918). 
POINT XI 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY S'TATES A CLAIM FOR RE-
LIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR SPE1CIAL DAMAGES 
BASED UPON NEGLIGEN1CE AND NEGLIGENT MISREP-
RESENTATION. 
It is submitted that plaintiff .has set out a claim for 
relief against defendant for special damages in his com-
plaint and in particular in Allegation No. 7, sub-section 
5 through and including sub-section 11 ( R. 61, 62, 63). 
Therefore, plaintiff contends his claim for special dam-
ages is well pleaded. 
POINT XII 
MISJOINDER OF ISSUES AND DAMAGE IS NOT A 
VALID GROUNDS TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT. 
It is f'ubmitted plaintiff has sufficiently described 
what legal damage plaintiff claims resulted from acts, 
doings, and omissions of defendant in Allegation No. 7, 
first cause of action (R. 58-9, 60-1-2-3) and Allegation 
No. VI, second cause of action (R. 73, 74-5-6-7-8-9, 80) 
to the degree the court considered defendant's motion 
to dismiss, paragraph 2 (R. 7). In this respect plaintiff 
contends even if it ",.ere found a misjoinder of claims 
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'vas n1ade, pursuant to Rule 18, lT.R.C.P. and Rule 20, 
( T.lt.(~.P., dismissal 'vould not be appropriate. 
POINT XIII 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SIGNING AND 
FILING "FINDINGS OF F ~CTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW NUNC PRO TUNC" IN THIS CAUSE, JANUARY 23, 
1962. 
It is subrnitted Rule 52 (A), U.R.C.P., precludes the 
entering of findings of fact and conclusions of law after 
judg1nent or order. 
In Re Thompson's Estate, 72 U. 17, 35, 2.60 P. 103, 
''A judgment rendered on no findings, or not 
upon sufficient or proper findings to sup·port 
it, has no Inore validity in equi,ty than at law." 
rrhis Honorable Court held in Utah Savings & Loam 
v. llfecha·m, et al. (1960), 11 1J. 2d 159, 356 P. 2d 281. 
Our rules (Rule 52(A), U.R.C.P. 1953) provide that 
the court must find facts specially and these cases well 
illustrate the necessity for full compliance wi~th this 
provision. It is apparent from the record (R. 234, page 
17, lines 19-20) that Judge lacked jurisdiction to sign 
and enter defendant's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law (R. 96) January 23, 1962, nunc pro tunc. 
Nunc pro tunc is not a proper method to timely file 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this matter 
the Court erred and plaintiff submits same should be 
voided and stricken from the record. 
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POINT XIV 
THE APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE ADEQUATELY 
STATES A PRIMA FACIE CAUSE AND CLAIM FOR RE-
LIEF BASED UPON FRAUD, DECEIT, CONSPIRACY, AND 
WILLFUL FRAUDULEN1T MISREPRESENTATION AS FOL-
LOWS: 
A. AN ATTORNEY IS LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR 
WILLFUL KNOWING FRAUDULENT MISREPRE-
SENTATION AND MISCONDUCT, WILLFUL KNOW-
ING, BREACH OF PROFESSI,ONAL DUTY IMPOSED 
BY LAW, BY WILLFUL KNOWING FAILURE TO 
EXERCISE DUE CARE, ORDINARY PRUDENCE 
AND SKILL IN CLIENT'S BEHALF. 
B. TH~T DEFENDANT FRAUDULENTLY, WILLFUL-
LY AND KNOWINGLY VIOLA·TED THE CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE UNI'TED STATES AND OF THE 
STATE OF UT·AH AND THE LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH DESIGNED 'TO PROTECT THE LIBERTY 
AND PROPERTY OF PLAINTIFF; THAT DEFEND-
ANT FRAUDULENTLY, WILLFULLY, AND KNOW-
INGLY VIOLATED THE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW INTENDED FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
PROTEC·TION. 
B(l) THAT TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL VIOLATED 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOR 
ABOVE REASONS. 
Plaintiff incorporates the argu1nent of Poin~t VII 
into this argument and states that his second cause of 
action (R. 63 to 83) adequately sets out willful, knowing 
fraud, deceit, conspiracy and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion \Yhere reference is made to negligence in th·e argu-
ments of Point "\TII. 
In the second a1nended complaint, second cause of 
action, the facts alleging the fraud and deceit are set out 
with particularity as required by Rule 9 (b) U.R.·C.P. In 
DaviJs Stock Co. v. H·ill, 2 TT. 2d 20~ 268 P. 2d 988 (1954), 
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this court set out the requirements for a pleading of 
fraud, noting that the true facts must be alleged also, 
unless they appear obvious from the pleadings. 
In the instant case plaintiff has made a showing in 
particular that meets w·ith all the tests of the above rule 
and following cases: 
Struck v. Delta Land and Water, 63 U. 495, 227 P. 
791 (1929): 
''Elements of actual fraud consist of: 
1. a representation. 
2. its falsity. 
3. its materiality. 
4. speakers knowledge of its falsity or ignor-
ance of its truth. 
5. his intent that it should be acted upon by 
person and in manner reasonably contem-
plated. 
6. hearer's ignorance of its falsity. 
7. his reliance upon its truth. 
8. his right to rely thereon; and 
9. his consequent and proximate injury." 
Pace v. Parrish, [Ttah 2-±7 P.2d 273 (1952'): 
"Elements of actionable fraud to be p·roved 
are a false representation of existing material 
fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the p·ur-
pose of inducing reliance thereon upon which 
plaintiff reasonably relies to his injury.'' 
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In Re Swans Estate, 4 U.2d '277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956): 
" ... thus a definite need is shown that the 
presumption arising out of confidential dealings 
shall shift the burden of persuasion that there 
was no fraud or undue influence onto the con-
fidential adviser. For the confidant relies on 
him and trusts him to give disinterested advice 
and counsel. ... " 
" ... but because in most cases it is apt to 
produce a correct finding of the facts, for a 
confidential adviser who practices fraud or undue 
influence has a strong motive for concealing the 
truth and the person whose confidence he betrays 
even though available as a witness does not know 
the schemes and plans used against him to accom-
plish the desired result .... " 
The court's attention is respectfully directed in the 
case of Sheru'ood v. South, 29 S.W. 2d, 805, attorney's 
improper collusion against client is a question for the 
jury on matters of fraud and da1nages. 
There can be no complaint that the instant pleadings 
are not sufficient unless as a matter of la"T they do not 
state a clain1 for relief as set out. It is submitted that 
they adequately set out such a claim. 
POINT XV 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY STATES A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR SPECIAL DAMAGES 
BASED UPO·N FRAUD, DECEIT, AND CONSPIRACY. 
It is submitted that plaintiff has set out a claim for 
relief against defendant for special damages in his 
complaint and in particular in Allegation VI, sub-section 
5 through and including sub-section 11 (R. 76, 77, 78, 79), 
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seeond cause of action. Therefore, plaintiff contends his 
clai1n for special damages is well pleaded in his s-econd 
cause. 
POINT XVI 
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY STATES A CLAIM FOR RE-
LIEF AGAINST DEPENDANT FOR TREBLE DAMAGES 
BASED UPON TITLE 78-51-31, U.C.A. 1953. 
There can be no complaint that the instant pleadin·gs 
are not sufficient in both first and second cause of action 
to support plaintiff's prayer and demand for treble 
damages under Title 78-51-31. DECEIT AND COL-
LlTSION. It is submitted that they adequately set out 
such a clai1n (R. 63) first cause of action, sub-section 
11; second cause of action (R. 79, sub-section 11). 
CONCLUSION 
The following statement is quoted from Vanderbilt 
Law Revi-ew, vol. 12, p·. 77 4: 
'~~The task set for a client who seeks to recover 
in an action of negligence is a formidable one·. 
He must first find another attorney who will 
take his case and prosecute it. This is likely to 
prove particularly difficult in some cities, and 
it may be exaggerated by the need' in some cases 
for the testimony of other attorneys regarding 
the character of the defendant's work. If the 
charge is negligence in regard to the conduct of 
litigation the client is required to win two cases ; 
he must show both that the defendant was negli-
gent and that plaintiff was entitled to 'vin the 
original suit and would have won it except for 
the defendant's negligence. He is likely to find 
the court, whether at trial or appellate level, 
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sympathetic to the defendant as a colleague at 
the Bar." 
Plaintiff nominates the foregoing stat,ement as the 
all-time gross ~understatement of a problem at law. 
Plaintiff submits whatever may be our wishes, our 
inclination, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot 
alter the state of fact, evidence, and law contained in 
this record. The la"7 will not bend to uncertain wishes, 
imagination and wanton dictates of unscrupulous, uneth-
ical, politically powerful men, whose sanctimonious 
hypocrisy would destroy the very foundation of our 
freedoms, yes, our very nation and our democracy. That 
foundation is the· greatest la\v and judicial system de-
signed to promote justice, libery, and equality for the 
benefit of all men the history of the world has ever known. 
Plaintiff submits this Honorable Court should grant 
this plaintiff the entire relief he has sought on this 
appeal, or relief in the alternative as sought. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
IIARRY G. HEATH~IAN 
P. 0. Box 15285 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney, per se 
for Ap1Jellant 
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